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Abstract 
 
A number of recent events – especially attempts to negotiate a bilateral 
trade agreement and Australia’s participation in the conflict with Iraq1  
– have thrown Australia’s relationship with the United States into 
sharp relief. While this relationship has historically enjoyed strong 
bilateral endorsement, this uncritical support is beginning to unravel. 
At the very least, the relationship is being subjected to a renewed, 
more critical scrutiny. This paper argues that a dispassionate analysis 
of the relationship is appropriate and overdue. Not only are the 
benefits that accrue to ‘Australia’ from the relationship debateable, 
even when judged within the limited calculus of the ‘national interest’, 
but Australia’s uncritical support for US foreign policy is also helping 
to entrench potentially damaging aspects of American foreign policy 
and – somewhat ironically – undermine the legitimacy of its pre-
eminent ‘hegemonic’ position.   
 
 
 
Since the Second World War, relations with the United States have assumed an 
increasingly prominent position in the construction of economic and security policies 
in Australia. Sentiment toward the US, both on the part of policy-making elites and 
within the wider public, has generally been positive, and the bilateral relationship, 
especially its strategic component, has enjoyed strong support across most of the 
domestic political spectrum. However, the US’s self-declared ‘war on terror’ in 
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general, and Australia’s participation in a conflict with Iraq in particular, have 
subjected the relationship to widespread scrutiny and criticism. Significantly, in the 
face of widespread public opposition to the conflict with Iraq, the Australian Labor 
Party (ALP) has moved to qualify its support. Indeed, some senior Labor figures have 
launched fairly splenetic attacks on American foreign policy and the Howard 
government’s support of it.2 While such criticisms may be self-serving and 
opportunistic, they are indicative of a more generalised and widespread shift in 
sentiment toward the US and its foreign policy (see The Economist 2003).  
 
For a government that came to power promising to ‘reinvigorate’ the relationship with 
the US, this is an unhappy, but possibly predictable, turn of events. Even before 
September 11 and the subsequent reordering of American foreign policy, the Howard 
government’s expectations about what the bilateral relationship with the US could 
deliver looked likely to prove a triumph of hope over experience: a glance at the 
recent historical record suggested that the benefits likely to accrue to ‘Australia’3 were 
likely to be modest at best. By contrast, as I shall argue in what follows, a closer, 
more exclusive relationship with the US looked likely to have a significant and 
generally negative impact on Australia’s long-term place in the region, its economic 
position, its political independence, and even its domestic security. In short, recent 
events and the Howard government’s enthusiastic reengagement with the US suggest 
that a critical and dispassionate reassessment of the costs and benefits of this crucial 
bilateral relationship is timely, if not overdue. Indeed, this is something that ought to 
be welcomed even by supporters of American dominance; for one of the great ironies 
of the Howard government’s fulsome and uncritical support of the US is that it has 
been instrumental in encouraging, or giving a veneer of legitimacy to, policies that 
appear unsustainable, possibly unachievable, highly divisive and ultimately corrosive 
of American authority. By contrast, a more critical, less reflexive alliance partner may 
benefit Australia and the US. 
 
In what follows I initially examine the economic dimension of the Australia-US 
relationship, arguing that by any measure, ‘Australia’ has not always been well served 
by either the actions of the US or by the approach of its own policymakers. 
Significantly, however, Australians have found it difficult to adopt a more assertive or 
self-interested position, in part because of the overarching strategic context in which 
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the relationship has been embedded - something that has been privileged by 
generations of foreign policymakers. The second part of this essay examines this 
strategic relationship and argues that, while there may be some possible benefits, there 
is an argument for greater distance in, or at least a reconfiguring of, this part of the 
relationship too. The argument for greater strategic and policymaking independence is 
reinforced in the final section, which considers the nature of the US’s dominance of 
the contemporary international system. It is important to remember that when US 
dominance was arguably most legitimate, constructive and benign in the first couple 
of decades after the Second World War, it was widely perceived to have assumed a 
hegemonic position that transcended national interest to provide international public 
goods (Kindleberger 1973). The US’s present determination to use its overweening 
power to pursue more narrowly defined and supported objectives means that 
policymakers in allied countries like Australia need to balance what are, in any case, 
debateable short-term domestic pay-offs against the long-term stability of the 
international system.  
 
The economic relationship 
 
When thinking about the costs and benefits of Australia’s economic relationship with 
the US, there are a number of possible ways of conceptualising the issues – none of 
which are without their own difficulties, and all of which necessitate making some 
contentious normative and disciplinary assumptions. Nevertheless, in an effort to 
simplify the discussion and highlight what I take to be the key issues, I shall initially 
outline and discuss the wider international political-economy in which the Australia-
US relationship is embedded, before describing and analysing the specifics of the 
bilateral relationship itself. 
 
The international context 
 
America occupies a unique place in the international economy. Not only is the 
American economy the world’s largest, but the US has played a pivotal role in 
shaping what is an increasingly interconnected international system and the ‘rules of 
the game’ that govern it (Ikenberry 2001; Latham 1997). This may seem an 
unremarkable observation, but it merits emphasis for a number of reasons. First, the 
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precise nature of the transnational governance mechanisms and regulatory structures 
that have emerged under US auspices in the post-war period were not inevitable, nor 
are they immutable. Although a detailed discussion of this period is beyond the scope 
of this paper, it is important to emphasise that the original post-war order devised at 
Bretton Woods and famously described by Ruggie (1982) as the ‘compromise of 
embedded liberalism’, has largely been replaced by a very different ‘neoliberal’ 
international order.4 The capacity of states – or at least, less powerful states - to make 
autonomous economic decisions has been eroded as a direct consequence of the 
increased influence of increasingly influential inter-governmental organisations like 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Trade Organisation (WTO), 
and by new non-state actors like credit ratings agencies (Sinclair 2001). Crucially, 
such changes have not occurred ‘naturally’ or inevitably. Rather, and this is the 
second point to stress about the contemporary international economic system, they 
have come about as a consequence of self-consciously pursued political decisions 
(Strange 1994).  
 
There is no intention here of attempting to resolve complex debates about the relative 
merits of market-centred or neoliberal systems versus those that advocate a greater 
role for governments, unions, or have a more general commitment to social welfarism 
However, it is important recognise, the growing influence of neoliberal ideas and 
agencies notwithstanding, that alternative forms of capitalist organisation do exist 
(Coates 2000), and that this has major implications for the domestic and foreign 
policies of countries that are predominantly rule-takers, rather than rule-makers. 
While recent generations of Australian policymakers have been active proponents and 
practitioners of neoliberalism, Australia’s physical location and its more limited 
capacity to influence the behaviour of other countries5 has given a distinctive 
character to its international economic diplomacy, one that is frequently made more 
difficult by American actions, despite an ostensibly similar policy framework. 
 
Important as the economic relationship with the US is, the central reality of 
Australia’s contemporary economic situation is that, taken as a whole, East Asia 
accounts for the bulk of Australia’s trade activity. Brute geography suggests this is 
unlikely to change. Australia’s preferred mechanism for encouraging greater 
economic integration within the region has been via the Asia Pacific Economic 
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Cooperation (APEC) forum, an organisation that was initially seen as a way of 
encouraging the adoption of neoliberal policies in an area primarily associated with 
neo-mercantilism and wide-spread state interventionism. While it is possible to argue 
that the expectations held about APEC’s capacity to fundamentally reconstitute the 
region’s trading practices were always somewhat naïve (Beeson 1996), what is of 
greater significance here is that much of APEC’s ineffectiveness can be attributed to 
US attitudes. For the US, APEC has always been of marginal interest, its principal 
significance being, as Ravenhill (2001, 93-97) observes, as part of a much larger geo-
political picture, offering some potentially useful leverage over the European Union, 
and as a way of containing an exclusively East Asian regionalism. Indeed, one of 
APEC’s most influential champions, Paul Keating (1998), described the US decision 
to invite Russia to join the organisation  - which suited US grand strategy, but which 
inevitably further reduced APEC’s identity and coherence - as ‘an act of economic 
vandalism’. 
 
Revealingly, in the aftermath of the East Asian crisis, the US choose to utilise the 
IMF, over which it has enormous influence (see Pauly 1997), in an attempt to 
encourage market-oriented reform in a region that had generally shown little 
enthusiasm for Anglo-American forms of organisation (Beeson 1999). The 
significance of this episode was not simply that the US saw the IMF as potentially a 
much more effective agent of change than APEC - Australia’s preferred mechanism - 
but also that much of the region resented the heavy-handed and intrusive behaviour of 
the Americans in support of widely criticised policies, which even the IMF now 
concedes may have been inappropriate (Fischer 2001; see also Stiglitz 2002). As a 
lonely outpost of neoliberalism in a region largely populated by unreconstructed 
interventionists, the Howard government – whose Asia credentials and enthusiasm 
were questionable at the best of times (Milner 2000; Beeson 2001) – faced the 
prospect of guilt by association. The risks of being cast as an outsider in the region 
were confirmed by Australia’s subsequent failure to secure a free trade agreement 
with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and its exclusion from the 
potentially important ‘ASEAN+3’ grouping, which brings together all of Australia’s 
major economic partners – with the exception of the US. 6 
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Clearly, it is not possible to demonstrate that Australia’s close association with the US 
has been solely responsible for its recent difficulties in the region and its failure to 
achieve key objectives. However, it is possible to argue that the enthusiastic 
privileging of the relationship with America on the basis of supposedly ‘shared 
common values’ (Howard 2001), in combination with pronouncements about 
Australia’s supposed cultural incompatibility with East Asia (Downer 2000), will 
have done little to convince neighbours that Australia is indeed committed politically 
to the region for the long-term. Indeed, there is a widespread perception in the region 
that Australia is closely allied to the US and lacks an independent identity or 
commitment to regional integration (Beeson forthcoming). In such circumstances, the 
need for the American relationship to deliver clear benefits is all the greater. 
Unfortunately, the evidence suggests that, in the economic sphere in particular, the 
principal benefits lie on the American side. 
 
The bilateral economic relationship 
 
It is worth re-emphasising that there are difficult conceptual and normative issues that 
make an assessment of national economic advantage inherently problematic. Not only 
are there problems associated with using national accounts figures to draw up a 
meaningful balance sheet of economic activity in an era when transnational ownership 
and production structures have rendered such figures increasingly meaningless (Bryan 
and Rafferty 1999), but there are more fundamental concerns about whether trading 
surpluses should necessarily be goals or measures of effective and sustainable 
economic policy (Lang and Hines 1993). Nevertheless, politicians and the unelected 
arbiters of national performance in international money markets regard them as 
important, so there are grounds for following suit. Even within the rather narrow 
calculus favoured by such actors, ‘Australia’ seems to be seriously disadvantaged. 
 
Australia is one of a select band of countries that actually runs a trade deficit with the 
US. While American markets have played a pivotal role in underpinning the export-
led development of much of the region, and more recently in sustaining a faltering 
global economy through seemingly insatiable consumer-led demand,7 Australia has 
not been a major beneficiary of either of these developments. Although the US is 
currently Australia’s largest single export market (after Japan), many of the products 
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Australia exports to the US are in ‘sensitive’ areas and thus subject to trade barriers 
and restrictions. Across a range of economic sectors and products – dairy, sugar, 
meat, grain, textiles, fast ferries, steel, commercial vehicles and even banking and 
finance (see CIE 2001) - there are a range of visible and invisible trade barriers that 
discriminate against Australian-based producers. 
 
In recognition of the continuing obstacle that trade barriers present, the Howard 
government has made achieving a free trade agreement (FTA) with the US one of its 
primary foreign policy goals. Supporters rightly point to the positive impacts such 
agreements can have on entrenching international law and encouraging peaceful 
economic interdependency (Oxley 2003). However, even in the unlikely event that an 
agreement could be reached that included agriculture and which overcame the 
entrenched opposition of American farmers and their political allies (Eccleston 2002a, 
10), the merits of such a deal for Australia’s overall position are debateable. As Ross 
Garnaut (2002) points out, one of the main costs of an exclusive agreement with the 
US is that it would enhance the perception amongst Asian neighbours that Australia’s 
interests lie outside the region; something that would further marginalise Australia 
from regional initiatives, and possibly lead to retaliatory action from countries 
concerned about the trade-diverting impact of such an agreement. As Garnaut (2002, 
136) makes clear, ‘In discriminating against imports from East Asia, Australia would 
be balancing the risk of small gains in 10 per cent of its export trade (directed to the 
US), against the risk of losses to more than half its exports (directed to Asia)’. 
 
More fundamentally, as Ann Capling (2001, 22) reminds us, ‘the only significant 
improvements in Australia’s access to the United States market have come in the 
context of multilateral negotiations’ [emphasis added]. For a small player like 
Australia, which has only the most marginal economic significance to the American 
economy, its individual capacity to overcome powerful vested interests is severely 
constrained. Australia’s long-term interests are best served by negotiating binding, 
multilateral, long-term agreements that can encourage the US not to use its immense 
power to pursue discriminatory bilateral deals that inevitably favour its interests and 
entrench inequitable outcomes.8 Moreover, even if Australia can reach a bilateral 
agreement with the US it would also include investment which, to judge by the 
precedent set by the North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA), would have major 
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implications for Australian economic sovereignty (Quiggin 2003). The growing 
importance of American investment in Australia means that any agreement is likely to 
replicate NAFTA provisions, handing American multinational companies 
‘unprecedented legal rights’ which could be exercised in defiance of local 
governments like Australia’s (Davidson 2002). Whatever the merits of legally 
enshrining such power, it would make life difficult for a Howard government that has 
shown a willingness to privilege the ‘national interest’ where it judges it appropriate 
to do so.9 
 
Debate about a possible FTA looks likely to remain academic, however. Despite 
continuing positive rhetoric from the US, including implicitly linking trade and 
security issues as a way of rewarding Australia’s strategic commitments (Sheridan 
2002a), nothing of substance has emerged. Indeed, Howard has been at pains to hose 
down expectations that a deal is likely in the foreseeable future (Shanahan 2001). He 
had little alternative: America’s unilateral decisions to subsidise American farmers to 
the tune of $US 73 billion (Eccleston and Lunn 2002), and impose new tariffs on steel 
imports,10 has not only revealed the impotence of Australian policymakers in 
substantially influencing American policy, but also generated tensions within a 
coalition government conscious their impact on key political constituencies (Doherty 
2002). More immediately, Australia’s prominent role in the ‘war on terror’, and its 
support for American targeting of Iraq, actually threatened long-standing export 
markets (Kerin 2002). In such circumstances, the strategic benefits of the Australia-
US relationship are thrown into even sharper relief and merit a similarly critical re-
assessment. 
 
The security relationship 
 
For all Howard’s talk about the need to ‘reinvigorate’ the relationship with the US, in 
the security sphere at least, it was hardly in a state of terminal decline. Indeed, one of 
the most striking features of Australian defence policy since World War II - a period 
that witnessed a decisive strategic reorientation in Australia from Britain to America 
as the key ‘great and powerful friend’ and putative security guarantor - is the 
remarkable degree of bilateral support for the alliance with the US. During the Cold 
War such uncritical uniformity may have been an unsurprising artefact of a more 
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ideologically charged, Manichean era. In the post-Cold War environment such 
unanimity might have been expected to evaporate. Remarkably enough, however, 
only when faced with the apparently terminal decline of opposition leader Simon 
Crean’s electoral support did the Labor Party, still shell-shocked from three 
successive election defeats, withdraw bipartisan support for US-led action against Iraq 
that was not mandated by the United Nations (Lewis 2002). Before considering the 
impact of this latest conflict on the alliance in any detail, however, it is worth briefly 
sketching some of the alliance’s more important features. 
 
The ANZUS alliance 
 
The backbone of the Australia-US strategic relationship is, of course, the ANZUS 
alliance. Despite the fact that the ‘NZ’ part of this famous acronym has disappeared 
from the picture, following New Zealand’s decision not to allow nuclear-armed 
vessels to use its ports,11 the alliance remains ‘an integral part of Australia’s political 
landscape and a key component of US global strategy’ (Tow and Albinski 2002, 153). 
It is also well known, firstly, that Australia obtained this coveted agreement with the 
US in return for not objecting to a ‘soft’ peace settlement with Japan, and secondly, 
that the ANZUS treaty does not actually commit either side to do more than ‘consult’ 
in the event of an armed attack and ‘meet the common danger in accordance with its 
constitutional processes’ (cited in Ball 2001, 251). Quite what this might mean in 
reality has never been clear, but despite the rather expedient and flimsy nature of the 
agreement, it continues to occupy a central place in the minds and, more recently, 
actions of Australian policymakers. In the aftermath of the September 11th attacks on 
America, the ANZUS treaty was invoked for the first time ever by John Howard 
(Garran 2001).  
 
Plainly, this was a gesture loaded with greater symbolic than strategic significance, as 
Australia could add nothing material to America’s overwhelming and increasing 
military dominance (see Brooks and Wohlforth 2002), but it was a gesture that 
continued an Australian tradition with a venerable heritage. In Korea, Vietnam, the 
Gulf and more recently Afghanistan, generations of Australian leaders have shown 
alacrity in supporting conflicts in which America was the major protagonist and in 
which Australia was part of the militarily marginal but ideologically indispensable 
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supporting cast. There is no intention of reviewing the merits of these earlier conflicts 
here, but it is worth pointing out that the current head of Australia’s armed forces, 
General Peter Cosgrove, has now conceded that ‘although the Australian army acted 
in an honourable way, this is not to say that what we did was sensible, taking the 
widest view’ (AFR 2001). Laudable as Cosgrove’s willingness to confront unpleasant 
historical realities may be, it simply highlights the importance of subjecting 
contemporary policies to greater scrutiny than they have generally received in the 
overwrought, post S11 atmosphere. Before undertaking such a task, it is important to 
say something about the more enduring aspects of Australia-US relationship generally 
and of ANZUS in particular. 
 
Why do Australian policymakers attach such importance to ANZUS if it does not 
unambiguously guarantee American assistance? One of the primary justifications for 
ANZUS and close military ties with the US revolves around the purported intelligence 
benefits that accrue to Australia. According to Des Ball (2001, 250) the UKUSA 
Agreement, which governs the operation of the so-called ‘joint facilities’ or the 
intelligence gathering and command and control systems run by the US  on Australian 
soil, is ‘the most important agreement to which Australia is a party’. Despite 
Australian defence planners having ostensibly moved to a more self-reliant defence 
posture, the rationale for both the continuing existence of the bases and for close ties 
with the US is that it provides access to intelligence and defence technology that 
would otherwise be beyond Australia’s reach.  
 
It is difficult to say anything sensible about the intelligence benefits that are supposed 
to flow from the relationship, as they are not subject to public scrutiny. What we can 
say is that, faced with the sort of threat Australians patently did face in Bali, this sort 
of information was either inadequate or, as seems more likely, not acted upon (Walker 
2002). Either way, recent events beg important questions about the value of the bases 
to Australia. As far as access to technology that would otherwise be unavailable is 
concerned, the arguments seem more straightforward. Given that even the 
government’s own defence review concedes that Australia is essentially a ‘secure 
country’ and that ‘a direct attack on Australia is unlikely’ (CoA 2000, ix) the primary 
rationale for Australia investing in extremely expensive weapons systems that are 
designed to fight large-scale conventional wars is predicated on maintaining inter-
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operability in the event that Australia might have to fight alongside the US. In other 
words, what Hugh White (2002, 257) describes as Australia’s ‘idiosyncratic’ strategic 
culture with a ‘strong predilection to alliances’, continues to lock Australia into 
ruinously expensive defence spending on equipment that is not in keeping with the 
reality of the threats Australia actually faces. Indeed, White (2002, 254) argues that it 
is Australia that is out of step with contemporary strategic realities, and that far from 
being an irresponsible free-rider, 
 
industrialised countries around the world will slowly follow New Zealand’s 
lead by moving out of the expensive capabilities needed in old-fashioned 
wars, and will move further down the road towards forces dominated by 
light, highly deployable land forces suited to the new tasks which have 
become so common in the decade since the Berlin Wall came down. 
 
Two further points that flow from Australia’s close strategic alignment with the US 
merit emphasis. First, in addition to doubts about the appropriateness of extremely 
high cost weapons systems, like the troubled Collins-class submarines and the 
proposed Joint Strike Fighter program - which will commit Australia to an unproven 
system that already looks out of place in Australia’s rapidly evolving non-traditional, 
regional security environment (Barker 2002) - it is apparent that the US is prepared to 
use its monopolistic position as a supplier of advanced military technology to secure 
direct commercial advantages. US Defence Secretary William Cohen’s threat to 
downgrade the military alliance if Australia brought in a major European equity 
partner to the submarine corporation building the Collins-class submarines (Garran 
2000) demonstrates how the Americans are willing to link economic and strategic 
issues in a way that compromises Australia’s independent decision-making and 
capacity to derive its own commercial advantages from defence spending. It is 
noteworthy that Australian policymakers have never felt able to exploit the strategic 
importance of the joint facilities in a similar way (see Ravenhill 2001). 
 
The second point to make about the strategic relationship is that it commits Australia 
to policies that reflect America’s global geo-political priorities, but which may not be 
in keeping with Australian interests. The most likely conceivable source of ‘old-
fashioned’, inter-state conflict in which some of Australia’s more high-profile and 
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expensive defence acquisitions might actually be used is a conflict between the US 
and China over Taiwan. However, as Malcolm Fraser (2001, 233) has argued, where 
Australia’s direct security interests and the defence of the nation are not at stake, it 
would be an ‘act of lunacy to participate in a conflict between China and America 
over Taiwan’ – especially as Australian participation could not materially affect the 
outcome of such a contest. Similar doubts have been raised about the US’s proposed 
National Missile Defence system which, whether it manages to overcome formidable 
technical problems or not, is likely to fuel a regional arms race that will actually 
undermine rather enhance Australia’s immediate strategic environment (Kelly 2000). 
The point to re-emphasise, then, is that Australia’s and America’s position in, and 
perspectives on, the world are not identical – something that makes the current 
government’s uncritical and enthusiastic support for any American initiatives all the 
more troubling. 
 
The ‘war on terror’ 
 
Perhaps the most egregious error of judgement that has flowed directly from John 
Howard’s personal enthusiasm for closer ties with the US came in his now notorious 
interview with The Bulletin (1999). Outlining what was described as ‘the Howard 
doctrine’, Howard chose not to disagree with a characterisation of US-Australia 
relations as one in which Australia would perform the role of ‘deputy sheriff’ for the 
US in dealing with regional trouble spots (Brenchley 1999).12 Although Howard, 
eventually, sought to distance himself from this construction, the damage to key 
relationships in Asia had already been done: regional critics who had declared that 
Australia had never been serious about engaging with, and becoming a more authentic 
part of, the region had a field day (Milner 2000). As noted earlier, the sort of widely 
held perceptions that, especially under the Howard government, Australian political 
elites are primarily interested in ‘Asia’ for instrumental, economic reasons, but their 
emotional commitments lie elsewhere, makes it increasingly difficult for Australia to 
participate in potentially vital regional groupings (Kelly 2002). The key point to 
emphasise, therefore, is that the perception that Australia’s foreign policy is not 
independent allows those hostile to Australian interests in the region to undermine 
Australia’s position (see Lewis et al. 2003). Despite the fact that much of the region 
appreciates America’s continuing regional engagement, this perception also makes it 
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more difficult for Australian policymakers to independently engage with the region – 
a possibility the Howard government seems relatively unconcerned about (Beeson 
2001). 
 
Although supporters of the alliance relationship persuasively argue that Australia’s 
close ties with the US contribute to regional stability and actually enhance Australia’s 
Asia credentials (Trood and Tow 1998, 118), the traditional argument that Australia’s 
security and identity is unambiguously reinforced by a close identification with the 
prominent  ‘great and powerful friend’ of the era has become less compelling. There 
are crosscutting and potentially competing economic and strategic interests that make 
any simple expression of the ‘national interest’ (short of an increasingly unlikely 
direct military threat to the Australian mainland, at least) inherently problematic and 
contentious.  In such circumstances, the US alliance must carry even greater weight 
We have already seen that the benefits of the bilateral economic relationship are 
skewed towards America, which remains quite prepared to use its overwhelming 
power to pursue its narrowly conceived national economic interests, and which seems 
unlikely to deliver the sort of economic agreement the Howard government so 
desperately needs to justify a major reorientation of Australian foreign policy. It 
should also be noted, however, that even in the strategic area, there is compelling 
evidence that the Howard government has seriously overestimated its importance to, 
and influence over, the US and its strategic priorities. In Timor, Australia’s most 
important overseas military deployment since Vietnam, the failure of the US to offer 
more than tokenistic support at a moment of considerable crisis for one of its 
supposedly key allies revealed the Howard government as having made ‘unwarranted 
presumptions about the substance of the relationship and the pecking order within it’ 
(Leaver 2001, 29). 
 
Despite the lukewarm support evinced by America toward Australia during the Timor 
crisis, the Howard government’s enthusiastic support for the US generally and for the 
‘war on terror’ in particular remains undiminished. Even before it was clear what 
precise form the American-led ‘war on terror’ might assume, or what part Australia 
might play in it, the Howard government offered unqualified endorsement of 
American policy (Beeson 2002). This was always a debateable strategy given that, as 
I argued above, Australia’s and America’s strategic interests cannot be assumed to 
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automatically coincide. However, the Bali bombings, and the concomitant spectre of a 
seemingly well-established terrorist network in the region, has highlighted the 
potential dangers of a strategy that is so reflexively and prominently supportive of 
American policies. Some high profile critics of Australian government policy claimed 
that Australians were deliberately targeted in Bali as a consequence of Australia’s 
support for the US, a proposition Howard vehemently repudiated (Shanahan 2002), 
but which has since been endorsed by the bombers themselves (Forbes 2003). 
Whatever the merits of these claims and counterclaims, a more fundamental and 
unambiguous limitation of the government’s open-ended commitment to the US 
became clear after Bali: Australia’s continuing military commitment in Timor, 
especially when coupled with its participation in the US-led interventions in 
Afghanistan and later Iraq, meant that Australia’s military resources were severely 
stretched.  
 
One of the more predictable consequences of recent events has been a renewed 
commitment by the Australian government to spend some $50 billion over the next 
decade on new naval ships, aircraft, electronics and army equipment (Barker 2002). 
Yet given that adequate intelligence appears to have been the Achilles heel of both the 
US and Australia, and given that both countries seem unlikely to experience the sorts 
of conventional attack such equipment is designed to repel, there is clearly a debate to 
be had about the wisdom of such outlays. Despite such a major commitment to 
expand defence funding, however, the Howard government was forced to give 
explicit recognition to the reality that Australia’s principal security concerns were 
regional and that they necessarily differed from the US’s global perspective 
(Eccleston 2002b). Such recognition is welcome, but does not go far enough, nor does 
it begin to address a more fundamental long-term issue: the evolving nature of 
American power and the place of allies like Australia within it. 
 
Australia and American hegemony 
 
One of the most striking paradoxes of the contemporary era is, of course, that at the 
very moment that American power is widely recognised as unparalleled in human 
history (Brooks and Wohlforth 2002), the US looks highly vulnerable to increasingly 
pervasive forms of unconventional attack from non-state actors. Faced with the 
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challenge of responding to the greatest violation of its domestic security yet 
experienced it is understandable that Americans would want to react decisively. The 
key question has always been about the precise nature of that response and the role 
that allies and inter-governmental organisations should play within it. America’s 
current pre-eminence means that, should it choose to do so, it can act unilaterally as 
there is effectively no power that can stop it. Before considering the implications of 
this unprecedented dominance in any detail, it is useful to contrast it with earlier 
phases of American ascendancy as it tells us much about the nature and possible 
sustainability of the current world order. 
 
The end of the old order? 
 
In a seminal analysis of the post-war international order which the US helped create, 
and which enjoyed a substantial degree of legitimacy, Robert Cox (1987, 7) suggested 
that such hegemony means more than simply the dominance of a single world power. 
It means 
 
dominance of a particular kind where the dominant state creates an order 
based ideologically on a broad measure of consent, functioning according to 
general principles that in fact ensure the continuing supremacy of the leading 
state or states and the leading social classes but at the same time offer some 
measure or prospect of satisfaction to the less powerful. … An incipient 
world society grows up around the interstate system, and states themselves 
become internationalised in that their mechanisms and policies become 
adjusted to the rhythm of the world order (Cox 1987, 7). 
 
Although Cox was operating within a Marxist-derived, Gramscian framework, his 
fundamental insights have been echoed by scholars working in a liberal tradition. 
John Ikenberry (2001), for example, has persuasively argued that one of the reasons 
that US power has become such a central and, until recently at least, largely 
unchallenged component of the contemporary international order is not simply 
because of America’s overwhelming military dominance, but because it has been 
instrumental in creating a highly institutionalised, rule-based order, which gives 
tangible benefits to many of its participants. In other words, not only did the US help 
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to create an array of key inter-governmental institutions like the World Bank and the 
General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs, which were designed to promote and 
maintain an open international economy and bind nations together through commerce, 
but America also agreed to exercise a degree of self-restraint as part of the implicit 
bargain. It is precisely this broadly supported order that appears to be threatened by 
both the actions of America’s enemies who regard its power as illegitimate and self-
serving, and by America’s own actions, which may lend credence to such claims. In 
short, we may be seeing a shift from a form of benevolent hegemony in which 
America enjoys broad support for its enlightened policies, to a more coercive form of 
hegemony in which America unilaterally pursues its own narrow national interests 
with or without widespread support.13 
 
Two points are worth emphasising about the old order: first, the ideological consensus 
that underpinned the US-inspired Bretton Woods regime has begun to unravel as the 
actions of agencies like the IMF and the WTO are seen as entrenching international 
economic structures that systematically discriminate against the developing world, 
and which are seen as failing to address the ingrained inequalities within which 
terrorism ferments (Beeson and Bell forthcoming).14 Second, the US itself no longer 
feels constrained by the transnational regime it helped create. Clearly, the overarching 
strategic environment from which the post-war international order emerged provided 
a powerful incentive for the US to act in ways that ensured the continuing loyalty of 
its allies in its seemingly endless struggle with the Soviet Union (Cronin 1996). 
However, even before September 11, it was apparent that the end of the Cold War had 
fundamentally transformed this underpinning strategic calculus, leaving the US less 
constrained by strategic imperatives and able to unilaterally pursue goals that were in 
its own national interest, rather than those of the system as a whole (Buzan and Little 
1999).  
 
In a range of areas – especially, but not exclusively, under George W. Bush - the US 
has displayed an increased willingness to pursue unilateral pathways to policy goals. 
Even during what proved to be the dying days of the Cold War, successive American 
administrations attempted to resolve their economic problems by applying direct 
unilateral pressure over key strategic allies like Japan in an effort to resolve economic 
imbalances that were then considered to result from declining American 
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competitiveness (Schoppa 1997; Bhagwati and Patrick 1990).15 Under the Bush 
regime, this predilection for unilateralism has become more pronounced (Dao 2002) - 
a development with major implications for the Asia-Pacific region of which Australia 
is a part (see Beeson and Berger 2003). Indeed, whether it is the refusal to sign the 
Kyoto Protocol, its withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, its opposition 
to the ban on land mines and the biological warfare convention, or its antipathy to the 
International Criminal Court, the US has displayed itself as being increasingly 
unwilling to be bound by precisely the sort of rules, regulations and institutional 
constraints that were such a fundamental part of the old order. The change in 
American thinking and the overwhelming strategic dominance that underpins it, is 
encapsulated by the US’s new doctrine of ‘pre-emption’, in which the US reserves the 
right to unilaterally attack perceived threats to American security (Harding and 
Wolffe 2002). Even where the US appears to take multilateral institutions and the 
possible benefits of international support for its actions more seriously, it is on the 
understanding that it is not bound by such actions and reserves the right to act 
independently (Kagan 2002). 
 
There are a number of important issues that emerge from this brief analysis of 
evolving American foreign policy. First, we should not be surprised if, freed from 
earlier strategic constraints, American foreign policy becomes even more reflective of 
powerful national rather than systemic interests (Trubowitz 1998). Second, although 
allies like Australia may not be materially necessary components of American 
strategies, they can play an important role in legitimising particular initiatives and in 
helping to consolidate American primacy. Although conventional international 
relations theory has – wrongly – led us to expect that other nations would attempt to  
‘balance’ the US’s dominant position in the aftermath of the Cold War (Waltz 1993), 
this has not happened.16 On the contrary, America’s position has become increasingly 
dominant and unipolar (Wohlforth 1999). The key question countries like Australia 
have to confront is whether this is good thing, or whether they would be better 
advised to try and encourage America to remain voluntarily constrained by the sort of 
multilateral institutions that were part of the earlier international order. The potential 
dangers of reflexively and uncritically supporting American policy were revealed 
when Howard echoed the Bush doctrine of pre-emption, suggesting that Australia 
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might follow suit – a suggestion that further problematised Australia’s already 
troubled relations with the region (Kerin and Price 2002). 
 
 
Australia and the new international order 
 
From a parochial perspective, there are a number of aspects of America’s recent 
policies that should have been subject to much greater critical scrutiny than they have 
hitherto received in Australia. The Howard government’s rapid, enthusiastic support 
for American policy should not disguise the fact that, as Michael Cox (2002, 56) 
observes, the big lesson to emerge after September 11 was that ‘America was able to 
define an agenda and compel support for that agenda from nearly all the world’s more 
important states’. Even if American policy had been above reproach on normative, 
strategic or any other grounds, the principle of giving one country de facto 
responsibility for establishing the collective default policy position on what may 
prove to be the defining international relations issue of the twenty-first century is a 
dubious one. In reality, America’s strategic and political baggage – not the least of 
which is its unswerving, non-negotiable support for Israel - its insistence on 
unequivocal commitments for or against the ‘war on terror’, and the predilection 
American policy elites display for understanding geopolitics through the prism of 
‘territory, population and the use of force’ (Cronin 2002, 132), leaves American 
policy, and that of its allies, open to criticism that it is self serving17 and contributing 
to a ‘clash of civilisations’ (Huntington 1996).18  
 
Critics on the left have long argued that, for America to maintain domestic unity, 
support for massive military expenditures, and the support of otherwise potentially 
fractious allies, ‘a threat of some kind is virtually indispensable’ (Anderson 2002, 12). 
Clearly, militant Islam has the capacity to fulfil the role formerly occupied by the 
Soviet Union during the Cold War as far as America is concerned. However, it is not 
necessary to subscribe to conspiracy theories to recognise that fundamentalism of 
some sort – the contested flip-side of American hegemony - could fill an important 
vacuum in the developing world, for as Bruce Cummings (1999, 368) observes, 
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The Third World is dominated by the advanced countries in a way 
unprecedented since the colonial era, and with most of it outside the loop of 
the prosperity of recent years, it is therefore a prime source of war, 
instability, and class conflict – but with no convincing anti-systemic model to 
follow. 
 
The parallels between a post-war Europe apparently menaced by, and drawn toward, 
an expanding ‘communist’ empire, and the contemporary period in which America 
once again confronts an implacable foe supported by its loyal allies is indeed striking. 
There is, however, one fundamental difference: post-war Europe was given powerful 
assistance by a hegemonic power that seemed far-sighted and benign. The Marshall 
Plan was the quintessential expression of a new order that promised to restore lost 
European prosperity (Milward 1984). By contrast, not only has the ‘developing 
world’ never had similar prosperity to lose, but many think that the present world 
order that America dominates, which has deviated significantly from the vision of its 
post-war architects, is deeply implicated in perpetuating a profoundly inequitable 
world order (Hoogvelt 2001). In such circumstances, and absent an initiative of 
Marshallesque proportions designed to alleviate some of the conditions which, all 
agree, are at least contributing to the current antipathy toward America and all it 
stands for, little will change. The dominant American response – unilateralism and the 
doctrine of pre-emption – threatens to entrench rather than transform the prevailing 
world order. More worryingly in the longer term, as Robert Manne (2002) notes, if 
the doctrine of pre-emption does not exist for other states, which feel similarly 
threatened, US policy ‘amounts to an almost formal claim to US world hegemony’. If 
such a doctrine does apply to all – and absent an overarching proscriptive normative 
framework that all subscribe to, why should it not? -  it threatens to plunge the world 
back into an era of unconstrained Hobbesian military confrontation.19   
 
While some in the developing world may question how benign and benevolent the old 
US-sponsored international order actually was, key allies like Australia have clearly 
been in the business of helping the US maintain its dominant position and the system 
over which it presides. If Australian policy elites remain wedded to this goal they may 
want to place the welfare of the system ahead of short-term national interest, for as 
Brian Victoria (2002) has observed, 
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The rogue nations of this world will never convince the US that it needs to 
relinquish some of its power to eliminate the existence of double standards 
in international affairs. Yet the same message, coming from a friend, might 
receive a more thoughtful hearing. 
 
Whether Australia has the will or the capacity to do so is, however, a moot point. 
While there are tentative signs of the Howard government taking a slightly more 
independent line in relation to the UN’s role in post-war Iraq, it remains effectively 
locked into the US’s over-arching strategy. Given that even Britain – clearly a more 
important ally than Australia – is finding it difficult to influence American policy, 
despite all the rhetoric about ‘influence’ and ‘special relationships’, there is little 
reason to suppose Australia will have any greater success. 
 
Concluding remarks 
 
There is much to admire about America. Many of the norms and values it so 
assiduously promotes20 are worthy in themselves and often spontaneously emulated. 
If the world must have a hegemonic power, there are worse candidates.  Successful 
market economies are highly desirable; the problem has always been creating the 
circumstances in which they can flourish whilst simultaneously overcoming 
structurally embedded obstacles to development and more equitable distributions of 
wealth and life-chances. As long as American policy seems – rightly or wrongly - 
self-serving at best and complicit in the maintenance of a fundamentally inequitable 
world order at worst, hostility toward the US and its allies will persist. In short, 
hegemony has costs as well as benefits. 
 
The great advantage of attempting to address some of the world’s more pressing 
problems through rule-based multilateral auspices is that it helps to establish a more 
broadly based notion of collective responsibility and makes the, frequently selfish and 
destructive, privileging of national interests more difficult. True, the pervasive nature 
of American hegemony means that it continues to exert a powerful influence over key 
inter-governmental institutions, including the much-reviled United Nations (see 
Cronin 2001). And yet, in an imperfect world, a model that is defensible in principle 
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but flawed in practice may ultimately be more sustainable (and potentially 
modifiable) than a model that is indefensible except in relation to a rather brutal form 
of Realpolitik. The world may indeed be faced with the reality of overweening 
American power for the foreseeable future; the challenge for the vast majority of non-
American countries is to discourage self-serving nationalism and the temptation to use 
that power to serve parochial interests. 
 
Clearly Australia has a limited capacity to influence American foreign policy. 
Australia’s political elites, especially under the current Howard government, have 
shown little inclination to divert from the tried and trusted Australian role of 
enthusiastic and uncritical supporter. There are powerful reasons for questioning the 
efficacy of this strategy, even when judged from the perspective of short-term 
political expediency or a narrowly conceived sense of the ‘national interest’. In both 
of the most important elements of its bilateral relationship with the US – economics 
and security – ‘Australia’ is clearly disadvantaged by America’s willingness to exploit 
its overwhelming political, economic, and strategic leverage. Whether it is measured 
by the difficulty of penetrating American markets, or by the impact Australia’s high-
profile support for American strategic initiatives has on Australia’s own regional 
relationships, the bilateral relationship is the source of a good deal of pain for what 
are generally fairly nebulous and/or endlessly deferred gains. Unsurprisingly, 
American policy has always been primarily designed to further American interests. 
The danger is that given America’s unprecedented primacy and a government that is 
more than willing to exploit it, self-absorption, unilateralism, and an instrumental 
attitude to allies will become the established order. It is in Australia’s and the rest of 
the world’s long-term interests to ensure that it does not.  
 
 
                                                 
1 This paper was conceived well before the outbreak of hostilities in Iraq. The long-
lead times associated with academic publishing mean it is impossible to fully consider 
what is, at the time of writing, a rapidly evolving and uncertain undertaking. 
However, the central contentions of this paper are, I think, reinforced rather than 
undermined by recent events. 
2 A number of prominent Labor figures, including Mark Latham, Lindsay Tanner, 
Martin Ferguson and Laurie Brereton, have been highly critical of both US foreign 
policy generally and the leadership of George W. Bush in particular [see Price et al. 
2003], prompting a strong response from Washington and direct intervention into 
domestic Australian political debates [see Kerin and Schubert 2003]. 
3 ‘Australia’ and ‘the US’ are less than satisfactory shorthand expressions for the 
complex array of domestic and international factors that culminate in national foreign 
policy, which limitations of space do not allow me to more fully explore. However, 
for a discussion of the Australian context, especially the domestic influences on 
policy see McDougall (1998), and for the US see Trubowitz (1998). 
4 For a useful discussion of neoliberalism and its antecedents, see Richardson (2001). 
5 It should also be noted that the complex array of processes subsumed under the label 
of ‘globalisation’ has also made autonomous policy-making more problematic for less 
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powerful states like Australia. This is all the more reason, of course, for pursuing 
broader, multilateral-based solutions to the challenge of international governance, 
rather than relying on the potentially conflicting self-interest of the most powerful 
country of the era. On globalisation, see Held et al. (1999), on Australian economic 
policy and globalisation see Beeson and Capling (2002) 
6 For a discussion of this important development, see Stubbs (2002). 
7 This strategy looks increasingly unsustainable on a variety of grounds, not the least 
of which is normative and central to debates about the inequitable nature of the 
contemporary international order. On the US economy’s problems, see Brenner 
(2002). 
8 Rogowski (1989) argues that it is actually in a hegemonic power’s interests to 
exploit its position in relation to trading partners and domestic lobbies will encourage 
it to do so. 
9 If American companies were involved, the decision to disallow a foreign takeover of 
the Northwest shelf gas project would have been impossible, had such an agreement 
been in place. 
10 One of AJPS’s anonymous reviewers rightly pointed out that the Howard 
government was able to reduce the impact of these tariffs on Australian exports 
through bilateral channels. While that was a significant development, it does not 
vindicate a bilateral approach or make ‘Australia’ any less vulnerable to future 
unilateral US decisions. 
11 It is worth noting in passing that New Zealand is now routinely characterised as a 
defence ‘bludger’ in the Australian press (Niesche and Garran 2001). More 
pertinently, perhaps, New Zealand’s security does not seem to have been noticeably 
compromised. 
12 Interestingly, senior US military officials like US Pacific commander-in-chief were 
happy to endorse this role. See Blair (2000) 
13 For a useful discussion of the distinction between benevolent and coercive forms of 
hegemony, see James and Lake (1989).  
14 Significantly, US Trade Representative Robert Zoellick explicitly acknowledged 
trade’s strategic implications while in Australia for WTO negotiations. See Hartcher 
(2002). 
15 It is also worth noting that in the post-Cold War era, the US has attempted to 
impose its preferred economic model and vision on parts of the world that have shown 
little enthusiasm for it. See Mastanundo (2000). 
16 Interestingly, the ‘coalition of the unwilling’ between France, Germany, Russia and 
possibly China, seemed to suggest that a limited form ‘balancing’ of a sort predicted 
by realist theorists, may indeed be beginning to occur in response to US unilateralism. 
See Walters (2003). 
17 It should be noted that a number of critics of American foreign policy have 
highlighted the strategic importance of Iraq’s oil fields and their attractiveness to 
America’s hitherto excluded oil companies. See Morgan and Ottaway (2002). 
Significantly, Bush had planned ‘regime change’ in Iraq before he actually won 
office. See Mackay (2002). 
18 A number of commentators in Australia portrayed the ‘war on terror’ in these sorts 
of civilisational terms. See, for example, Sheridan (2002b); Carroll (2002). 
19 Significantly, the big lesson North Korea seems to have drawn from recent events 
and the US’s more assertive and increasingly unilateral military strategy is that 
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amassing greater quantities of weapons of mass destruction is the only way to ensure 
independence. See Lunn (2003). 
20 In the aftermath of September 11, the US has embarked on a major attempt to win 
hearts and minds in the Middle East and South Asia. See de Grazia (2002). 
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